Aztlan-Network-News Blog

Monday, December 03, 2007

Read: Plan Mexico Unveiled

Lunes~ Diciembre 3, 2007 ~ Greetings All My Gente ~

I for one appreciate the Latin America Working Group. We need a lot more writers and reporters expressing their opinions and sharing their analyses in these troubled times about complex conditions in Mexico and Latin America in general. The great giant herd rarely speaks when being slaughtered.

I believe we have a sacred responsibility to write, to express, to share our thoughts with each other ~ even if they may seem off the wall ~ so long as they are done with a true humane sincereity to help build bridges of understanding between us all. No one man, group or organization has a monopoly on the truth of the times.

We should not forget that Mexico is still a neo-colony of the U.S. Empire, not an independent nation. In fact, directly or indirectly, the U.S. Empire hovers over all nations and, directly or indirectly, controls and/or has great influence over all so-called national economies. Naturally I suspect the rich and powerful drug cartels are working with large globalwide corporate powers to keep the drug traffic moving. After all, it is thedemand by the American people that keeps it going.

What dynamics or geometry of power has really fundamentally changed in the last fifty years?!? The U.S. Empire still rules supreme over the roost!

It is corporate capitalism that must be confronted and transformed. The oppressed peoples must be liberated from their old oppressors and rid themselves of submissive servant mentalities bowing to the masters of corporate capital.

"In order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle for their liberation, they must perceive the reality of their oppression, not as a closed world from which there is not exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform. This perception is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for liberation; it must become the motivating force for liberating action." ~Don Paulo Freire, Pedagogy of the Opressed.

Keep up the good work! Venceremos! ~Peta-de-Aztlan~
Sacramento, California. AmeriKa
Email: sacranative@yahoo.com

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Latin America Working Group <lawg@lawg.org> wrote:

Plan Mexico Unveiled

Dear Border Advocates,

Following months of rumors and media speculation on both sides of the border, President Bush announced in late October that he would be sending a sizeable counternarcotics and organized crime aid package to Congress. The package's stated intention is to combat the escalating violence associated with drug trafficking and organized crime with $500 million in aid to Mexico and $50 million to Central America. Popularly dubbed "Plan Mexico", this proposed plan piqued our attention as LAWG, along with countless grassroots activists, have long expressed strong concerns regarding past U.S. counternarcotics aid efforts that have compromised human rights, such as Plan Colombia.

Plan Mexico (also known as the Merida Initiative) was developed behind closed doors so many specifics remain unclear. However, we wanted to send you this (below) article that we have written for an upcoming edition of LAWG's publication, "The Advocate". The article outlines what we know about the package as well as our initial concerns regarding the human rights implications of the plan. Although there is currently no specific point of action, we invite you to share our concern as we monitor the issue. As details are released in the coming weeks and months we will post updates and send action alerts as needed. With your help we can work to promote programs that strengthen rule of law and protect human rights.

Best,
Jenny & Ellen
Latin America Working Group
www.lawg.org

LAWG Advocate: Plan Mexico Unveiled

President Bush announced in a October 22^nd press conference he was sending to Congress a counternarcotics and organized crime aid package that would include $50 million for Central America and $500 million for Mexico the first year. The plan refers to a total of $1.4 billion for Mexico over the course of the next three years. Officially titled the "Merida Initiative"â€"but with the Mexico portion already popularly dubbed "Plan Mexico" â€" this funding request forms a part of a controversial $46 billion supplemental budget request by the President primarily intended for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Congress will likely not consider this supplemental bill before the new year.

Due to the extremely troubling precedent set by past U.S. counternarcotics programs, especially Plan Colombia, this aid package raises some red flags for us. Although specifics have been difficult to pin down, a State Department fact sheet details that helicopters, surveillance aircraft, inspection equipment, and communications technologies are included in the proposed aid to Mexico. According to a document obtained by the Washington Post and described in an October 27^th article, the White House breakdown lists "counternarcotics, counterterrorism, and border security" as the largest segment of the package, accounting for $306.6 million. A positive part of the package, from our perspective, is its substantial funding to strengthen justice institutions in Mexico and to fund youth gang prevention activities in Central America.

Human rights advocates have raised concerns regarding Mexican President Felipe CalderÃ³n's strategies for addressing drug trafficking and related violence, especially his extensive use of the military in counternarcotics efforts. Favoring a mano dura (strong arm) approach, President CalderÃ³n responded to the dramatic outbreak of drug-related violence by deploying 10,000 military and federal officers to Baja California and his home state of MichoacÃ¡n within weeks of taking office. At the current time, there are over 20,000 troops engaged in joint counternarcotics efforts with police in areas hard hit by drug-related violence throughout Mexico. This funding could encourage further expansion of the military into inappropriate policing roles.

The human rights implications of deploying soldiers to combat domestic drug cartels was highlighted by a September 2007 report issued by Mexico's National Human Rights Commission. This report cited cases of numerous human rights abuses perpetrated by the military in the course of counterdrug operations, including rape, torture, murder and robbery, including the June, 2007 incident in Sinaloa in which soldiers opened fire on a pick-up truck after it failed to stop at a checkpoint, killing three women and two children.

Soldiers are not trained for domestic law enforcement and should not take over policing roles, even in cases where, as in Mexico, police are tainted by corruptionâ€"instead, this highlights the need for serious police reform and oversight. The continuing impunity surrounding the excessive use of force and human rights violations committed by federal, state and municipal authorities against those engaged in social protest in Oaxaca, San Salvador de Atenco and elsewhere underscores the critical need for substantial police reform and increased accountability.

At the same time, there is a serious problem of drug-related violence in Mexico that the Mexican government must address and that human rights advocates cannot ignore. As noted in a January 22, 2007 Christian Science Monitor article, drug trafficking related homicides in Mexico have more than doubled in the past 5 years, increasing from 1,000 in 2001 to 2,100 in 2006. Therefore, it is important to distinguish in this package the counterdrug programs that might be effective and do not raise human rights objections, from those that we believe will have a negative impact on human rights.

Members of Congress from both sides of the border have rightfully stated their unease over the secretive nature in which the CalderÃ³n and Bush administrations negotiated this package. The somewhat chilly reception that the Merida Initiative has met in the U.S. Congress could be heard at a recent hearing where Representative Delahunt (D-MA) suggested that the secretive negotiations "could delay the passage of this proposal." Other representatives asked if tackling drug-trafficking in Mexico would merely result in the cartels shifting trafficking routes to the Caribbean or elsewhere. Representatives questioned the utility of this funding without increased efforts to curb drug consumption in the United States. Western Hemisphere subcommittee chair, Representative Engel (D-NY), noted that "the defeat of Mexican cartels will not end drug use in the U.S."

In the coming weeks, advocates in the United States, Mexico and Central America will press for concrete details so as to evaluate the human rights implications of the proposed plan. As we have in Colombia, we will call for strategies that strengthen rule of law, protect human rights, and oppose the use of the military for law enforcement. Moreover, we will encourage attention to the "balloon effect" of U.S. counterdrug policy, in which cracking down on one geographic area just sends the problem of drug production and drug trafficking to another area, with all the violence and human suffering that follows. We will reiterate the need to expand drug treatment and prevention programs both abroad and at homeâ€"the most effective and humane counterdrug strategy.

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Come Together and Create!
Peter S. Lopez ~aka:Peta
Sacramento, California, Aztlan
Email: sacranative@yahoo.com

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Humane-Rights-Agenda/

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NetworkAztlan_News/

http://www.networkaztlan.com/
C/S

Solidarity of Cuban journalists with Rebelión

http://mwcnews.net/content/view/18498&Itemid=1

Solidarity of Cuban journalists with Rebelión

Pascual Serrano was also told to shut-up!
By Tubal Paez

Inspired by the anti-neoliberal movement and bolstered by the new information and communication technologies, a strong popular dissidence is growing in the battle for ideas around the globe; all in opposition to the existing media totalitarianism that silences or distorts reality.

In thousands of digital publications and Web sites, sincere and honest people by the legion, be them journalists, translators, investigators, academics and specialists in many disciplines, give the Web a humane supportive touch, one both hopeful and combative.

This global network allows for opinions to circulate, news and commentary that the so-called traditional media exclude as a rule. It should then come as no surprise that the prevailing and unilateral thinking be unmercifully discharged against these discrepant stands. Repressive actions may be taken that can range from a legal demand, or the denial of licenses, or economic hardship via confiscation of funds and equipment, to physical aggression and even murder.

One of these alternative sites (alterative as well) of great popularity is www.rebelion.org, a not-for-profit medium that pays nothing to its collaborators and which gives the news a different treatment in order to unveil those interests that economic and political power in the capitalist world might wish hidden in order to maintain their privileges and status.

These days, there is a major scandal making the rounds. It has to do with a repressive action pertaining to copyright issues, and brought about by the Spanish daily, El País, a corporate entity, against www.rebelion.org and its director, journalist Pascual Serrano, a Spanish national, demanding that they shut up or pay. The reason behind it centers in the fact that in the last few years their denunciations have been uncovering the dirty play of the great European press – particularly the one in Spain – surrounding important international happenings, and more specifically in Latin America where there is an ongoing process of change to benefit those in disfavor until now, and to stop the looting of the national wealth.

An article by Serrano showing conclusive data supporting an open anti-Chávez conspiracy by the Spanish daily spilled the cup, and the firm instructed its attorneys to take action. Even if the demand is ridiculous, it doesn't mean that we don't consider it important. Such demand operates under neoliberal logic and the expansionist impunity which permeates in the audio-visual and print media.

As a reflection of that situation, owners of the European and world press intend to demand payment of news materials as intellectual property. There have been legal processes in that regard, such as the one dealing with the Google search engine in a Belgian tribunal. As the pot was being stirred it came to the surface a project of law in Europe with the intention of charging royalties for the publication of news. There is also concern in Spain for how far this new law could reach and add to the Law of Intellectual Property, with restrictions to the "right to footnote" and to the circulation of "writings on current events."

We should stay on guard to defend the voices of the small media which represent the interests of the excluded majorities, since legislation is being drafted quietly to bring about legal instruments which will favor the great media magnates who are intent in being paid for the publication of news considered to be exclusive and which could turn out to be the arrival of a hurricane, the landing of an asteroid or tomorrow morning's temperature.

www.Rebelion.org and Pascual Serrano are not just crumbs at the breakfast table of a frivolous international media mogul. For the money-owners, they are simply hindrances on the way to word-control anywhere, and also the payment for information on reality.

After all the screaming by the big Hispanic media as a result of the last Ibero-American Summit, and the rude manipulation of what was said by President Chávez in the debate, there was fear that certain truths would come to light, as it happened, in those surroundings where neoliberalism forced down the obstacles and provided a prescription to alleviate a capitalism in crisis and sink the region in poverty and hunger.

Let us not overlook that in Chile alone 90 radio stations are owned by the same daily, El País, a corporate entity known as Grupo PRISA that boasts it owns 1,235 radio stations, the majority in Latin America. In this part of the world, that corporation has experienced spectacular growth and tremendous profit. It also has operations in Mexico, Bolivia, Panama, Costa Rica and Colombia; it is in the latter country where Caracol Radio, according to promotional material from this multinational firm, is the "leading transmitter that continues increasing its audience growth and profitability."

The neoliberal tsunami in the press media took the last fig leaves covering the smut of the media that claim to be defenders of freedom of expression but in essence defend the economic and political interests of great capital. The deep changes in Latin America have forced confrontation of the two worlds, and let evidence demonstrate that certain champions of democracy and freedom are nothing more than strong censors or vulgar oppressors.

Grupo PRISA is a corporation and like any other it is considered to be a legal person, without body or soul but with the same rights as regular people, such as possession of property, the buying, selling and profiting on such property, and the total freedom of movement within the system. But as would be expected, it lacks values of its own that human beings have such as helping one's neighbor, solidarity and altruism. And it is ruled by the profit motive first and foremost and the law of the jungle; its survival and growth will depend on the annihilation of the weakest.

It becomes necessary to denounce the cynic contentions of the daily El País, a corporate entity, and to unveil its lies, even remember its prior stands, when in its pages it gave certain possibility to allow expressions from the left. But that would be asking for the moon. That daily is just following its mission of playing mind games with its readers as part of the strategy of the parent corporation that converts all the subsidiaries in moneymaking machines.

Because of that, its bank account contains among the different sources of profit, that which results from the white slave trade, the exploitation of women and prostitution in Spain since in the advertising pages of this daily El País, corporate entity, as in the other important Madrid newspapers, the sale of young women is advertised, as if they were autos, computers or Alicante nougat.

If WWW.Rebelion.org engaged in that type of mercantile promotions it would never have been the subject of pressure or legal ultimatums. Its only crime is to have divergent opinion. It makes no difference that such opinion may coincide with that of hundreds of millions of Cubans, Venezuelans, Bolivians, Nicaraguans, Ecuadorians or other Latin Americans; the important thing is to stay quiet, talk about something else or just keep the thoughts to oneself.

Professionals of the Cuban Press, answering the call of the Latin American Federation of Journalists, unite in solidarity with Pascual Serrano and the operating team at Rebelion.org, recognizing that there is extraordinary merit to that serious and rigorous space which spreads the news, and which has become of valuable support for an ever increasing group of readers and small media that lacks the technical, human and financial resources to ensure its own coverage of international news.

The legal action initiated by the daily El País, corporate entity, deserves the repudiation of honest journalists throughout the world.

NOTE: Tubal Paez is President of the Journalists' Union of Cuba.
(Article was translated from Spanish by MWC editor, Ben Tanosborn)

Ben Tanosborn an editor of MWC News, after completing graduate studies at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), set out for a career in international business that would take him to five continents, expose him to several cultures and make him realize the importance for any and all Americans to become goodwill ambassadors for the United States.

Other articles by this author
http://mwcnews.net/Ben-Tanosborn

‘Ameripol,’ a Latin America Regional Police Force, is Being Formed: By Sam Logan

http://www.mexidata.info/id1633.html

Special 120307 Logan

Monday, December 3, 2007

'Ameripol,' a Latin America Regional Police Force, is Being Formed

By Sam Logan

· In a region where the military is often asked to perform police duties, a regional police force has formed to combat that tendency, but a number of challenges remain.

Latin America's first regional police force is now on its way to becoming a reality thanks to a number of accords signed by 18 countries on 14 November in Bogotá, Colombia, breathing life into a potentially promising but shaky new institution, Ameripol.

This vast new regional police force will face a number of challenges to become truly effective. Still, many see it as a significant step toward higher standards of professionalism and accountability in a region where many countries count on the military to perform public security functions that in most cases should be reserved for the police.

Ameripol's primary function will be to draw upon police resources at a regional level to combat the transnational criminal elements that operate in two or more countries between Argentina and Canada – along a vast trail from supply to market in the Western Hemisphere.

While police in Colombia may work closely with police in Mexico or Brazil, they may have relative little communication with police in Haiti or Uruguay. Police in Jamaica may have little contact with police in Brazil. Yet criminal elements in all these countries, in one way or another, are likely in constant communication to assist with a number of tasks including drug transport and storage, money laundering or simply to find a place to hide.

Transnational crime

According to the charter agreement, obtained by ISN Security Watch from Ameripol's presidential office in Santiago, Chile, the organization defines a "transnational crime" as that which is "committed in more than one nation-state; committed in one nation-state where a substantial portion of planning, organization or control was conducted in a second state; committed in one nation-state by an organized criminal group that conducts criminal activities in a second nation-state; and committed in one nation-state but has significant effect on a second nation-state."

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) is considered one of the region's most active transnational criminal groups. As a drug trafficking organization, FARC supplies Mexican, Guatemalan, Venezuelan, Brazilian and other networks with the cocaine they need to meet demand in the markets they serve.

Brazilian criminals work with coca paste suppliers in Peru and Bolivia, gun suppliers in Paraguay and Argentina, and money launders in the tri-border region between Argentina, Paraguay and Brazil. Peru's Sendero Luminoso network, once known as a tough Maoist group, is now believed to work as the guard detail and muscle for organized criminal groups operating in Peru to grow coca leaves and opium poppies.

The Suri-Cartel, formed between criminals in Colombia, Suriname and Brazil, inaugurated a guns-for-cocaine bartering system in the 1990s using Surinamese and Brazilian guns, Brazilian planes and pilots, FARC-supplied cocaine and Surinamese connections in the Netherlands to sell hundreds of kilos of cocaine to the European market.

There are dozens more examples of transnational criminal groups working together to combine regional resources, avoid detection and boost their businesses. Until now, there was a relatively limited level of regional cooperation on the law enforcement end. Apart from Interpol, the US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and some bilateral cooperation between national police, a regional police resource was lacking and sorely needed.

Strengths and weaknesses

Latin American militaries have been used countless times to handle the work most perceive as the purview of police forces.

"Militaries are [not] an appropriate or effective institution for confronting transnational crime," Joy Olson, director of the human rights group Washington Office on Latin America, told ISN Security Watch, adding that "you can send the military to quell violence for a time, but ultimately you have to be able to arrest and prosecute criminals, and it is the police and judiciary who hold those responsibilities."

Ameripol, as a regional initiative, takes a step in the direction of strengthening police forces in member countries. There is potential for a higher level of accountability, and with the participation of highly professional police forces such as those in Chile and Colombia, the possibility for technology transfer, especially in the area of forensics and the judicial process, is promising.

Ameripol also offers a regional point of interaction for other transnational organizations such as Interpol, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), the Organization of American States (OAS) and the UN. Rather than taking the time to interact with individual police forces to gather information on the various elements of one transnational criminal group such as FARC, the DEA or Interpol, theoretically, could go to one point of contact for information coming in from across the region.

Sharing this information, however, is entirely voluntary. Due to the rigor of sovereignty in the region, some argue that there is little a regional initiative can do to work against national self-interest.

"[A] compartmentalized approach to issues and sensitivity to information sharing, make it unlikely that much in the way of useful tactical information will ever find its way to Ameripol," Ian M. Cuthbertson, director of the New York-based Counter-Terrorism Project with the World Policy Institute, told ISN Security Watch.

While it is entirely beneficial to share some information, there might be a significant amount of intelligence that could be tagged as necessary to keep secret for national security and thus rendered untouchable for regional use, even if the information is important for a specific investigation conducted by a member nation.

The only way to get around such sensitive issues is perhaps through personal bonds and relationships. Ameripol does provide an avenue for the inception and growth of such relationships, but it may be some time before they can take root and begin to bear fruit.

What the future holds

The success of Ameripol will likely be based less on the functionality of the organization as a whole and more on the individual relationships that through random phone calls and e-mails or ad-hoc meetings tie the network of professional policemen together.

To date, the region has shown an incredible ability to interdict increasingly larger drug shipments. Since 2005, interdictions have grown significantly from three, four and five tons to a recent seizure of over 20 tons of cocaine in Mexico. Yet such high numbers of interdiction suggest an increase in the amount of cocaine – or any product – that is trafficked, according to a widely held belief that interdictions represent only a fraction of what is actually transported.

With an initial membership of 18 countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay), Ameripol has ample regional coverage. Yet it is worrying that Venezuela, quickly evolving into the region's latest playground for organized crime, is not on the membership list.

Just as disconcerting is the absence of Trinidad and Tobago, considered a major gun trafficking link between the Americas and Africa, and St. Marteen, a hotspot for organized criminal activity in the Caribbean. The future inclusion of these countries will certainly help to add strength to the network, even if concerns for corruption, especially in Venezuela, diminish the goodwill necessary to share actionable intelligence.

Put to the test

Already, Ameripol has been put to the test.

On 5 November, one Nicaraguan, two Colombian and three Honduran drug traffickers escaped from prison in Nicaragua. According to local reports, two Nicaraguan police assisted with the escape. With fugitives from two different countries on the loose in a third country, where corruption facilitated escape, this case is a perfect example of the necessity of Latin American police cooperation at a regional level. This case is also exemplary of the challenges, namely corruption, that Ameripol faces as it moves ahead.

In a region where political will to involve military elements in a case such as the Nicaraguan jailbreak is at times greater than the will to support the police in their investigation, it is reassuring for many that Ameripol stands next to military involvement as another option. Moving forward, it will be up to Ameripol to live up to its mandate. Given the amount of transnational organized crime in Latin America, there will be vast opportunity for Ameripol to prove itself, or die trying.

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This article was originally published at ISN Security Watch (11/26/07). The International Relations and Security Network (ISN) is a free public service that provides a wide range of high-quality and comprehensive products and resources to encourage the exchange of information among international relations and security professionals worldwide.

Sam Logan is an investigative journalist who has reported on security, energy, politics, economics, organized crime, terrorism and black markets in Latin America since 1999. He is a senior writer for ISN Security Watch. For issues related e-books go to www.samuellogan.com/publications.htm.

Reprinted with permission from ISN.

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Come Together and Create!
Peter S. Lopez ~aka:Peta
Sacramento, California, Aztlan
Email: sacranative@yahoo.com

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Humane-Rights-Agenda/

http://groups.yahoo.com/group/NetworkAztlan_News/

http://www.networkaztlan.com/
C/S

Making Sense of Venezuela’s Constitutional Reform+

Bloglink: http://aztlannet-news-blog.blogspot.com/2007/12/making-sense-of-venezuelas.html

http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/analysis/2943

Making Sense of Venezuela's Constitutional Reform+

December 1st 2007, by Gregory Wilpert – Venezuelanalysis.com

The Venezuelan government's effort to create "21st century socialism" is moving ahead full-steam with the December 2nd constitutional reform referendum. While tensions and confusion about the reform are rising in Venezuela, it is important to realize that this reform will mean both less and more than most outside observers seem to think. That is, as usual, many pundits, such as from the Venezuelan opposition and from so-called international experts, are painting a picture of a Venezuela that is about to finally slip into "Castro-communism," a picture that could hardly be further from the truth and that has been falsely predicted for Chavez's entire presidency of now nine years. While there are negative or not-so-good aspects of the reform, which for the most part involve giving the president some more powers, the Venezuelan president, even after the reform, is still does not have as much institutional power as the U.S. president.

On the other hand, in the process of focusing on the centralizing aspects of the reform, most observers willfully miss the ways in which the positive aspects of the upcoming reform have the potential to make Venezuelan political life more in tune with the interests of the country's mostly poor majority.

Shortly after President Hugo Chavez was reelected on December 6, 2006, he announced that a reform of the 1999 constitution would be one of the first tasks of his second full term as president. According to Chavez, the reform was to smooth the path for the creation of "Bolivarian" or "21st Century" socialism because the 1999 constitution was a product of a more moderate president and population.[1] On August 15 of this year, eight months after his reelection, Chavez presented his proposal to alter 33 articles of the constitution to the National Assembly (AN). The AN, according to the constitution, is allowed to discuss and revise the president's proposal over a period of two years. However, following a relatively rushed process that was accompanied by numerous public forums in all parts of the country, the AN added another 36 article changes and passed the entire proposal with the required two-thirds majority on November 2. The National Electoral Council then had 30 days to organize a national referendum on the proposal, which is now scheduled to take place on December 2nd.[2]

What the Reform is About

Chavez's constitutional reform project deepens policies in five main areas: participatory democracy, social inclusion, non-neoliberal (socialist?) economic development, politico-territorial reorganization, and stronger (or more effective?) central government. In addition, there are a few changes that don't fit into any of these categories, mainly because they don't do anything much, except adorn an already very progressive constitution. While the vast majority of these changes are progressive, in the sense that they deepen democracy and social inclusion, some can be considered regressive, in the sense that they weaken earlier achievements of the 1999 constitution. Also, one must recognize, just as some in the Chavez government have argued, that the reform represents a "transition" towards "21st century socialism," not its full implementation, which is still somewhat unclear. As such, it misses elements that progressives in many countries would consider essential for real socialism. Let us briefly review each of the above-mentioned aspects of the reform, before turning to the political context of the reform.

Deepening Participatory Democracy

In one of the greatest departures from the 1999 constitution, the reform proposal introduces a new level of government, the "popular power" (art. 136 of the reform proposal). This power is in addition to the municipal, state, and national powers of the political system. The popular power represents the "lowest" level of government, in that it is the organization of communities in forms of direct democracy. Because of this, the reform states, "The people are the depositories of sovereignty and exercise it directly via the popular power. This is not born of suffrage nor any election, but out of the condition of the human groups that are organized as the base of the population."

The opposition has tried to twist the meaning of this article, claiming that it lays the groundwork for dictatorship because it supposedly means that the authorities of the popular power are named from above, since they are not elected.[3] This, however, represents a willful misunderstanding, as the popular power is supposed to be the place where democracy is direct, that is, unmediated by elected representatives. This is not to say that there wouldn't be any elections at this level, but that those who are elected are not representatives, but are delegates of the community, who are to execute the community's decisions. Currently this popular power takes the form of the citizen assemblies and their communal councils. According to the reform, it would also take the form of worker, student, youth, elderly, women, etc. councils.

Another more sophisticated criticism has been that incorporating popular power, in the form of the various forms of popular organizations, into the state's structure implies a cooptation of civil society.[4] That is, citizens, by virtue of their activism, would be turned into civil servants. This would be true if all of civil society, in its totality, were to be absorbed into state structures. However, the reform limits the popular power to those councils or groups that are organized in accordance with the constitution and the law as being part of the popular power. In other words, rather than co-opting or absorbing all of civil society into the state, the reform proposes to provide more democratic and more consistent channels for citizen involvement in their self-governance. Civil society groups that are organized outside of these channels would still be free to organize and mobilize independently of the state.

However, since power is to be devolved from municipal, state, and national governments to the popular power (art. 168, 184, 264, 265, 279, 295), that is, to the communal and other councils, consistent channels for the use of this power must be established, which is done via the councils of the popular power. Many reform articles, for example, state that communities are to be involved in the co-management of businesses (art. 184), that municipalities must involve the popular power in their activities (art. 168), that they have a role in the nomination of members of the judicial, electoral, and citizen branches of government (art. 264, 265, 279, 295), and that they receive at least 5% of the national budget (art. 167) for their community projects.

Deepening Social and Political Inclusion

The second area that the constitutional reform deepens is social and political inclusion by giving all citizens the right to equal access to city resources ("right to the city," art. 18),[5] prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation and health condition (art. 21), including young people in the political process by lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 years (art. 64), requiring gender parity in candidacies for elected office (art. 64), protecting people from having their primary home expropriated due to bankruptcy (art. 82), introducing a social security fund for self- and informally employed Venezuelans (art. 87), guaranteeing free university education (art. 103),[6] recognizing and promoting the culture Venezuelans of African descent (art. 100), and giving university students parity in the election of university authorities (art. 109). These are all forms of social and political inclusion that, if realized, would place Venezuela at the forefront in the world in this regard.

Deepening Non-Capitalist (Socialist?) Economic Development

Next, the reform would move Venezuela further along a path of non-capitalist economic development.[7] That is, the effort to deepen non-capitalist and perhaps socialist development is centered on strengthening democratic control over the economy while weakening private sector control. For example, the central bank, which is normally under the sway of international financial institutions, would no longer be independent (art. 318, 320, 321) and the state may turn food producing and distributing businesses over to public or collective control in order to guarantee food security (art. 305). Also, the state oil company PDVSA will face stronger restrictions against privatization (art. 303).

The 1999 constitution had stated that PDVSA may not be privatized, but that its subsidiaries could. However, since PDVSA is a holding company that consists only of subsidiaries, it could, in theory, be entirely privatized by a government so inclined. The reform would prohibit the privatization of any national components of PDVSA. In other words, the often money-losing international subsidiaries of PDVSA could still be privatized at some point.

In addition to strengthening the state's involvement in the economy, the reform also strengthens the role of organized communities and of workers in the economy. For example, land reform is made more effective by allowing its beneficiaries (mostly cooperatives) to occupy land they have been granted before court challenges to the land redistribution are settled in court (art. 115). Until now, the land reform has often been hampered by land owners who would tie up the reform in court for many years, while the land would remain idle.

Reducing the workweek from 44 to 36 hours per week would give workers more power, vis-à-vis employers (art. 90).[8] Workers rights are also strengthened in that the reform opens the possibility for greater workplace self-management, via worker councils (art. 70, 136) and directives that publicly owned enterprises should involve greater self-management (184 no. 2).

Also, eliminating intellectual property while maintaining authors' rights to their creations, makes it more difficult for companies to profit from the creative work of others, while still protecting authors' rights over their productions (art. 98).

In addition to strengthening the position of the state and of workers relative to private capital, the reform would also strengthen the position of domestic business relative to international business because it removes the requirement that foreign companies be treated the same as national companies (art. 301).

Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the reform introduces a variety of new forms of property that move the notion or property away from purely individualistic conceptions (art. 115). These new forms are collective, social, and public property. Critics have pointed out that the differences are poorly defined, which is true.[9] Nonetheless, these different forms open up the possibility for the creation of socialist production enterprises, as the state has planned.[10]

Altogether, these forms of strengthening workers and of the state with regard to private capital definitely represent a move away from classical capitalism. The degree to which it represents 21st century socialism rather than social democracy or state socialism will depend on exactly which direction and how far these moves are taken in the laws that will work out the details of the constitutional mandates.

Developing a "New Geometry of Power"

The "New Geometry of Power" is perhaps one of the most misunderstood aspects of the constitutional reform. The opposition and the oppositional media consistently interpret it as a blatant effort to give President Chavez dictatorial power over states and municipalities. Indeed, the reform lends itself to this misreading because it says the president may designate a variety of new politico-geographic areas, such as federal territories, federal municipalities, federal cities, and "functional districts," and may name the respective authorities, without defining the power of these authorities or the function of these new territorial divisions (art. 16).

However, it is absurd to claim that the lack of a clear definition in this regard means that these new territorial divisions or the respective authorities would take power away from elected representatives if the reformed constitution does not say that their powers would be diminished in any way. Rather, the main purpose of this new geometry of power, according to government representatives, is to allow the president to designate national resources and presidential powers to particular areas. That is, the idea is to concentrate national attention and resources on specific areas, regardless of their existing politico-geographic boundaries, that are in need of such attention because of their poverty or their unused human or physical resources. Existing local power structures would remain untouched and unaffected by the designation of these areas, other than in the sense of receiving more national government attention. If anything, the reform implies that communal councils can form governing structures at the city-wide level, thereby moving power down to the communities, rather than up to the president.[11]

The real question in regard to this aspect of the reform is whether it is necessary to include the president's ability to designate federal territories in the constitutional reform at all, since they do not alter existing power structures. The president already has the power to focus national government attention on specific regions, which he has done via the nuclei of endogenous development. These are zones for special government attention that appear to be quite similar to those proposed in the constitutional reform, but which were created by presidential decree, without specific constitutional authorization. Including this aspect of the territorial reorganization in the reform thus appears to give additional authorization for something that the president can already do.

More importantly, though, for the reform and for a new geometry of power, is the president's and the National Assembly's new ability to re-organize municipal boundaries (art. 156 no. 11, 236 no. 3). While the politico-territorial division of states within the country's borders was always and still is a matter of a national law, with the reform the president appears to have the authority to re-organize the municipalities within the individual states, which used to have that power. This is an important change because Venezuela's municipalities are organized in a completely irrational manner that goes back as much as 200 years and has rarely been changed. The rationale for giving the president the power to reorganize these is that this needs to be done with a national-rather than parochial-vision in mind.

Strengthening Of the Presidency and the National Government

This last point, about the reform giving the president the power to reorganize municipal boundaries, touches on the larger issue of the reform slightly strengthening the president's powers in a variety of ways. Of course, the oppositional media (including the international pundits) consistently present this as "sweeping new powers," without backing this up. The most controversial changes in this regard include the removal of the two-term limit on serving as president (art. 230). However, over half of the heads of government in the world have "sweeping power," including some of the world's most respected democracies, such as France, Germany, Britain, and Italy.

Removing the limit on the number of reelections and extending the presidential term from six to seven years (art. 230) are meant to strengthen the presidency in order to carry out the long-term project of Venezuela's political and economic transformation from capitalism to socialism. In a way, opponents ought to be grateful that Chavez is not proposing a transition within his current presidential term (which lasts another five years), but a transition with a much longer time line, which would be far less traumatic and thus gives the opposition far more opportunities to reverse the project.

Extending Chavez's presidency (if reelected) is a mixed problem, though. On the one hand, Chavez supporters are right to say that it is more democratic if citizens are free to elect whomever they choose, as often as they choose, without artificial limitations. On the other hand, supporters of this principle ought to address the main reason such unlimited reelections are often prohibited, which is that presidents tend to accumulate power and can use the advantages of their office to make it more difficult for challengers to eventually win the presidency. This would mean placing strict restrictions on using the office of the president in one's presidential campaign. Currently limitations of this sort are rather limited in Venezuela.

The other controversial strengthening of the office of the president is the reform's toughening of states of emergency. According to the reform, the right to being informed would be suspended during a state of emergency, which implies that censorship may be used in such situations (art. 337). The rationale for this is that the April 2002 coup attempt was based on manipulating the media to fabricate events that ended up justifying the coup. A state of emergency, according to Chavez supporters, would have to take such a course of events into account. Contrary to most news reports, though, the state of emergency still includes the right to defense, to a trial, to communication, and not to be tortured. This is more than one can say for the current situation in the U.S., where the president has the authority to arrest people without due process, according to the recently passed Military Commissions Act.

Another area where the office of the president is being strengthened is in his ability to promote all military officers, not just high-ranking ones, as was previously the case (art. 236 no. 8). While this strengthens the president's control over the military and will probably increase the premium placed on loyalty to the president, it is not a "sweeping power" that will turn Venezuela into a dictatorship. Rather, this is something that ought to be within the purview of the military's commander in chief, even if it might not be the wisest way to handle promotions.

Another common criticism of the reform with regard to the president's "sweeping powers" is that the president may name as many vice-presidents (including regional ones) as he or she chooses (art. 236 no. 5). However, considering that the reform text does not say what these vice-presidents' powers would be, the only possible interpretation is that they have none except those that the president is already authorized to give to other members of his cabinet. Contrary to common perception, the powers of the vice-president thus cannot usurp the powers of any other elected official. In effect, vice-presidents would be nothing else than glorified ministers.

A change that has received little attention from the opposition, presumably because they support it, is that the reform makes citizen-initiated referenda more difficult by substantially increasing (by up to 100%) the signature requirements for launching such referenda (art. 71-74). The argument for this change is that frivolous referendum petitions must be prevented, especially since the referendum procedure is quite costly for the Venezuelan state. For example, few people noticed that none of the referendum petitions for members of the national assembly succeeded in 2004, even though dozens of petitions had been filed to recall pro-Chavez and opposition representatives. The signature collection and verification process costs millions of dollars and may be initiated on the whim of groups that claim they have the ability to collect the requisite signatures.

However, by increasing the signature requirements, in most cases more petition signatures will be needed to organize the referendum than votes will be needed for the referendum to pass. Such a situation reverses the logic of the signature collection process, which is merely supposed to indicate sufficient interest in a possible referendum, not represent a higher hurdle than the vote itself. In the end, the referendum process is thus significantly weakened (and the national government thus strengthened) in the name of greater efficiency, when other procedures might have been found that do not weaken the citizen-initiated referendum process as a whole.

Chavez has argued that he needs these relatively modest increased powers in order to defend the project against those who would oppose it by illegal means and in order to bring about more changes more effectively.[12] In other words, the strengthening of the president's office continues the slightly contradictory trajectory of the Chavez years, where greater democracy and greater citizen participation is introduced from the top, by the president. Strengthening the presidency thus, in this process, is also supposed to mean strengthening participatory democracy.

Unnecessary Changes

While the vast majority of proposed changes to the 1999 constitution indeed deepen participatory democracy and social inclusion, there are several changes that don't seem to add much other than nice words to the constitution. This is particularly the case with the terms "socialism" and "socialist" that the reform introduces in at least 11 of the reform articles, without ever defining what the term means (art. 16, 70, 112, 113, 158, 168, 184, 299, 300, 318, 321). Again, critics have attempted to interpret this as an effort to eliminate political pluralism, saying that using this term would mean that non-socialists would not be allowed to participate in the political system.[13] Such an interpretation is perhaps justified by the way the term was used in state socialist countries of the East Block, but there is no indication in the current constitution that this is a valid interpretation. As former education minister Aristobulo Isturiz points out,[14] Spain's constitution refers to its political system as a parliamentary monarchy, but this does not mean that those who are opposed to monarchies are not allowed to participate in Spain's political system. In other words, there is nothing in the reform that could limit Venezuela's explicitly pluralist political system (article 2) in any way.

Still, the inclusion of the term "socialist" in many parts of the referendum seems unnecessary, other than to give a label to something that has not been proven to deserve this label. Also, given that the meaning of the concept of socialism (unlike that of monarchy) is a hotly contested one, putting such a label on Venezuela's political and economic system opens it up to abuse. The danger that the label is confused with the ideal is quite real. After all, the state socialist countries of the East Block were labeled socialist, but that alone does not mean that they were. It seems far wiser to simply go about creating socialism in the sense of achieving liberty, equality, and social justice for all and then leave it to historians to decide whether the Venezuelan system deserves the label "socialist."

Another clearly unnecessary change is the inclusion of the social programs known as missions in the reform (art. 141). Given that the missions are operating just fine within given social framework, it is not clear at all why these need to be "legitimated" by being mentioned in the constitution.

Missing Changes

Despite the large number and large reach of the changes that the National Assembly and President Chavez are proposing, these changes fail to include issues that would go even further in creating socialism in Venezuela. For example, if socialism means true equality of opportunity, then it ought to include a woman's right to an abortion. This, though, is still not part of Venezuela's constitution, largely because there is no consensus within the government coalition in favor of such a change. Also, if socialism means real self-determination, then the reform should include much stronger provisions for self-management in all workplaces, both public and private.

Next, if citizen participation is a key feature of 21st century socialism, then the power of communal councils should be extended to regional and even national levels, not just city-wide levels, to either compete with or displace representative democracy on these levels. Finally, if 21st century socialism means assuring a fair and sustainable production and distribution of goods and services that go beyond the distribution mechanisms of the market and of the state, then new forms of distribution and production need to be invented. The reform does not touch on this at all, though, presumably because such a change would require a completely new constitution, with the convocation of another constitutional assembly.

Prospects for the Reform

As the above review of the constitutional reform shows, the vast majority of changes would deepen participatory democracy, social inclusion, and non-capitalist economic development. Those relatively limited changes that strengthen the presidency, which Chavez and his supporters say are needed for pushing the other reforms even further, cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be considered "sweeping new powers," as critics and the media like to call them. Although the necessity and wisdom of some of the changes are definitely debatable, the most controversial changes that strengthen the president's powers, such as eliminating limits on reelection, eliminating central bank autonomy, tightening control over the military, strengthening states of emergency, and increasing the president's ability to reorganize the politico-territorial divisions of Venezuela do not represent dictatorial powers - not even close.

The only reason Chavez appears to have dictatorial powers in the eyes of the opposition is because he and his supporters control all branches of government, which, indeed, makes "checks and balances" against presidential power more difficult. But whose fault is it that Chavez and his supporters control all five branches[15] of the Venezuelan state? Ultimately, the Venezuelan people and the opposition are responsible for this situation.

The Venezuelan people are responsible because they are the ones who have voted in support of Chavez and his coalition parties over and over again, with overwhelming majorities (the last time with a near 2/3 majority of 63% of the vote in last year's presidential election). The opposition is responsible because they have consistently messed-up, boycotted, and otherwise obstructed the democratic process in Venezuela, thereby losing political credibility and popular support.

Despite this rather depressing state of affairs for the opposition, Chavez handed the opposition yet another chance to redeem itself when he launched the constitutional reform. Chavez says that this move was necessary for the deepening of Venezuela's socialist transformation, but, strictly speaking, many of these changes could have been made without the reform and those that could not, could have waited until 2012 for a more deliberate reform process than the one that took place.

By rushing the reform process Chavez presented the opposition with a nearly unprecedented opportunity to deal him a serious blow. Also, the rush in which the process was pushed forward opened him to criticism that the process was fundamentally flawed, which has become one of the main criticisms of the more moderate critics of the reform.[16] The loss of these former moderate Chavez supporters serves to strengthen the opposition. Also, the rush makes it easier for the opposition to paint the reform on its terms than on the government's terms. After all, it is always far easier to spread disinformation about something quite complex such as the reform than it is to spread serious and well-reasoned explanations about it while also correcting the disinformation.

This is why the reform appears to have suffered some setbacks in public opinion. Opposition-affiliated and government-affiliated opinion polls appear to be farther apart than they have ever been, compared to earlier electoral contests during the Chavez presidency. Part of the explanation for this divergence is, first and foremost, the confusion about the reform and the consequent unwillingness of a large segment of the population to commit to vote either for or against it. Abstention will thus be relatively high. And high abstention makes voting trends notoriously difficult to predict, which means that it is more likely that opinion polls will reflect the biases of their contractors.

In the end, it all boils down to which side mobilizes more supporters. That is, while it seems that the undecided lean against the reform, Chavez supporters tend to be far more enthusiastic about their support for their leader and thus far more easily mobilizable than the opposition is. In other words, if turnout is high, around 60 to 70%, it is likely that the vote will be very close, while if it is low, around 50% or less, the yes side will win.

Unfortunately, if the constitutional reform passes by a small margin, this increases the likelihood that the opposition will falsely claim fraud and will mobilize its more radical elements to launch a destabilization campaign. Such a claim, though, as many opposition supporters have begun to recognize,[17] will have no basis in reality because the electoral system has become more transparent and more verifiable than nearly any electoral system in the world. All eyes will be on Venezuela and only a sound defeat of false fraud claims, both nationally and internationally, will avert greater tensions in Venezuela's still deepening political process that has created more democracy and more social inclusion.

Gregory Wilpert is author of Changing Venezuela by Taking Power (Verso Books, 2007) and is principal editor of Venezuelanalysis.com

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http://www.venezuelanalysis.com/news/2950

Chavez Concedes Venezuela's Constitutional Reform Lost in "Photo Finish"

December 3rd 2007, by Venezuelanalysis.com

Caracas, December 3, 2007 - Venezuela's National Electoral Council Announced at 1:15am that the No vote against the President's constitutional reform proposal lost 49.3% to 50.7%, with 45% abstention. Chavez conceded that the reform proposal lost "for now."

The vote was divided into two blocks, whereby the first block included Chavez's 33 proposed article changes and the second block included changes proposed by the national assembly. The second block lost with a slightly higher margin, with 51.0% for "No" to 49.0% for "Yes".

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http://www.granma.cu/ingles/2007/diciembre/lun3/49chetica.html

Havana. December 3, 2007

Chávez: the Revolution demonstrated its ethics

By Juan Antonio Borrego—Granma daily special correspondent—

CARACAS, December 3.—The vote on the constitutional referendum yesterday in Venezuela demonstrated the ethics of the Bolivarian Revolution, affirmed President Hugo Chávez in a press conference after the referendum was narrowly defeated.

"For now, we were not able to do it," Chávez stated, while stressing that the country's institutional nature was demonstrated. "That points the way for the opposition to stop its leaps into the void and the road of destabilization and violence," he noted.

"We are made for a long battle," said the leader early Monday morning after the result was announced by Tibisay Lucena, president of the National Electoral Council (CNE).

The reform of 69 Constitutional articles and 15 provisional regulations were presented in two blocs. The CNE president stated that 50.7% of electors voted "No" and 49.29% voted "Yes" for the first group of laws, while the second group obtained 51.05% against and 48.94% for the reforms.

"The fact that 49% voted for the socialist project is a great political leap forward and we are keeping up the battle by building socialism within the framework allowed us by the Constitution," Chávez emphasized. "This program is still alive and we shall follow it by working to attain maximum social inclusion and equality."

The president commented on the abstention rate of 44.11% and observed that if work had been undertaken with the three million people who voted for him last year in the presidential elections and did not go to the polling stations this year, the result would have been a different one.

"We complied with our Constitution, and with our conscience. We would not in any way have accepted a pyrrhic victory," he affirmed.

"We are going to prolong, extend and deepen the perspective and content of the process of building a socialist Venezuela in order to increase – as far as possible – the strategic speed of change of a revolution in the process of maturing," he stated.

Translated by Granma International