Thursday, August 26, 2010

10 Needed Steps for Obama to Start Dismantling America's Gigantic, Destructive Military Empire

http://bit.ly/c5ZYFR
By Chalmers Johnson

10 Needed Steps for Obama to Start Dismantling America's Gigantic, Destructive Military Empire

The failure to begin to deal with our bloated military establishment will condemn the U.S. to devastating consequences.

However ambitious President Barack Obama's domestic plans, one unacknowledged issue has the potential to destroy any reform efforts he might launch. Think of it as the 800-pound gorilla in the American living room: our longstanding reliance on imperialism and militarism in our relations with other countries and the vast, potentially ruinous global empire of bases that goes with it. The failure to begin to deal with our bloated military establishment and the profligate use of it in missions for which it is hopelessly inappropriate will, sooner rather than later, condemn the United States to a devastating trio of consequences: imperial overstretch, perpetual war, and insolvency, leading to a likely collapse similar to that of the former Soviet Union.


According to the 2008 official Pentagon inventory of our military bases around the world, our empire consists of 865 facilities in more than 40 countries and overseas U.S. territories. We deploy over 190,000 troops in 46 countries and territories. In just one such country, Japan, at the end of March 2008, we still had 99,295 people connected to U.S. military forces living and working there -- 49,364 members of our armed services, 45,753 dependent family members, and 4,178 civilian employees. Some 13,975 of these were crowded into the small island of Okinawa, the largest concentration of foreign troops anywhere in Japan.


These massive concentrations of American military power outside the United States are not needed for our defense. They are, if anything, a prime contributor to our numerous conflicts with other countries. They are also unimaginably expensive. According to Anita Dancs, an analyst for the website Foreign Policy in Focus, the United States spends approximately $250 billion each year maintaining its global military presence. The sole purpose of this is to give us hegemony -- that is, control or dominance -- over as many nations on the planet as possible.


We are like the British at the end of World War II: desperately trying to shore up an empire that we never needed and can no longer afford, using methods that often resemble those of failed empires of the past -- including the Axis powers of World War II and the former Soviet Union. There is an important lesson for us in the British decision, starting in 1945, to liquidate their empire relatively voluntarily, rather than being forced to do so by defeat in war, as were Japan and Germany, or by debilitating colonial conflicts, as were the French and Dutch. We should follow the British example. (Alas, they are currently backsliding and following our example by assisting us in the war in Afghanistan.)


Here are three basic reasons why we must liquidate our empire or else watch it liquidate us.

1. We Can No Longer Afford Our Postwar Expansionism

Shortly after his election as president, Barack Obama, in a speech announcing several members of his new cabinet, stated as fact that "[w]e have to maintain the strongest military on the planet." A few weeks later, on March 12, 2009, in a speech at the National Defense University in Washington DC, the president again insisted, "Now make no mistake, this nation will maintain our military dominance. We will have the strongest armed forces in the history of the world." And in a commencement address to the cadets of the U.S. Naval Academy on May 22nd, Obama stressed that "[w]e will maintain America's military dominance and keep you the finest fighting force the world has ever seen."

What he failed to note is that the United States no longer has the capability to remain a global hegemon, and to pretend otherwise is to invite disaster.


According to a growing consensus of economists and political scientists around the world, it is impossible for the United States to continue in that role while emerging into full view as a crippled economic power. No such configuration has ever persisted in the history of imperialism. The University of Chicago's Robert Pape, author of the important study Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism (Random House, 2005), typically writes:

"America is in unprecedented decline. The self-inflicted wounds of the Iraq war, growing government debt, increasingly negative current-account balances and other internal economic weaknesses have cost the United States real power in today's world of rapidly spreading knowledge and technology. If present trends continue, we will look back on the Bush years as the death knell of American hegemony."

There is something absurd, even Kafkaesque, about our military empire. Jay Barr, a bankruptcy attorney, makes this point using an insightful analogy:

"Whether liquidating or reorganizing, a debtor who desires bankruptcy protection must provide a list of expenses, which, if considered reasonable, are offset against income to show that only limited funds are available to repay the bankrupted creditors. Now imagine a person filing for bankruptcy claiming that he could not repay his debts because he had the astronomical expense of maintaining at least 737 facilities overseas that provide exactly zero return on the significant investment required to sustain them… He could not qualify for liquidation without turning over many of his assets for the benefit of creditors, including the valuable foreign real estate on which he placed his bases."

In other words, the United States is not seriously contemplating its own bankruptcy. It is instead ignoring the meaning of its precipitate economic decline and flirting with insolvency.

Nick Turse, author of The Complex: How the Military Invades our Everyday Lives (Metropolitan Books, 2008), calculates that we could clear $2.6 billion if we would sell our base assets at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and earn another $2.2 billion if we did the same with Guantánamo Bay in Cuba. These are only two of our over 800 overblown military enclaves.


Our unwillingness to retrench, no less liquidate, represents a striking historical failure of the imagination. In his first official visit to China since becoming Treasury Secretary, Timothy Geithner assured an audience of students at Beijing University, "Chinese assets [invested in the United States] are very safe." According to press reports, the students responded with loud laughter. Well they might.


In May 2009, the Office of Management and Budget predicted that in 2010 the United States will be burdened with a budget deficit of at least $1.75 trillion. This includes neither a projected $640 billion budget for the Pentagon, nor the costs of waging two remarkably expensive wars. The sum is so immense that it will take several generations for American citizens to repay the costs of George W. Bush's imperial adventures -- if they ever can or will. It represents about 13% of our current gross domestic product (that is, the value of everything we produce). It is worth noting that the target demanded of European nations wanting to join the Euro Zone is a deficit no greater than 3% of GDP.


Thus far, President Obama has announced measly cuts of only $8.8 billion in wasteful and worthless weapons spending, including his cancellation of the F-22 fighter aircraft. The actual Pentagon budget for next year will, in fact, be larger, not smaller, than the bloated final budget of the Bush era. Far bolder cuts in our military expenditures will obviously be required in the very near future if we intend to maintain any semblance of fiscal integrity.


2. We Are Going to Lose the War in Afghanistan and It Will Help Bankrupt Us

One of our major strategic blunders in Afghanistan was not to have recognized that both Great Britain and the Soviet Union attempted to pacify Afghanistan using the same military methods as ours and failed disastrously. We seem to have learned nothing from Afghanistan's modern history -- to the extent that we even know what it is. Between 1849 and 1947, Britain sent almost annual expeditions against the Pashtun tribes and sub-tribes living in what was then called the North-West Frontier Territories -- the area along either side of the artificial border between Afghanistan and Pakistan called the Durand Line. This frontier was created in 1893 by Britain's foreign secretary for India, Sir Mortimer Durand.

Neither Britain nor Pakistan has ever managed to establish effective control over the area. As the eminent historian Louis Dupree put it in his book Afghanistan (Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 425): "Pashtun tribes, almost genetically expert at guerrilla warfare after resisting centuries of all comers and fighting among themselves when no comers were available, plagued attempts to extend the Pax Britannica into their mountain homeland." An estimated 41 million Pashtuns live in an undemarcated area along the Durand Line and profess no loyalties to the central governments of either Pakistan or Afghanistan.


The region known today as the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan is administered directly by Islamabad, which -- just as British imperial officials did -- has divided the territory into seven agencies, each with its own "political agent" who wields much the same powers as his colonial-era predecessor. Then as now, the part of FATA known as Waziristan and the home of Pashtun tribesmen offered the fiercest resistance.

According to Paul Fitzgerald and Elizabeth Gould, experienced Afghan hands and coauthors of Invisible History: Afghanistan's Untold Story (City Lights, 2009, p. 317):

"If Washington's bureaucrats don't remember the history of the region, the Afghans do. The British used air power to bomb these same Pashtun villages after World War I and were condemned for it. When the Soviets used MiGs and the dreaded Mi-24 Hind helicopter gunships to do it during the 1980s, they were called criminals. For America to use its overwhelming firepower in the same reckless and indiscriminate manner defies the world's sense of justice and morality while turning the Afghan people and the Islamic world even further against the United States."

In 1932, in a series of Guernica-like atrocities, the British used poison gas in Waziristan. The disarmament convention of the same year sought a ban against the aerial bombardment of civilians, but Lloyd George, who had been British prime minister during World War I, gloated: "We insisted on reserving the right to bomb niggers" (Fitzgerald and Gould, p. 65). His view prevailed.


The U.S. continues to act similarly, but with the new excuse that our killing of noncombatants is a result of "collateral damage," or human error. Using pilotless drones guided with only minimal accuracy from computers at military bases in the Arizona and Nevada deserts among other places, we have killed hundreds, perhaps thousands, of unarmed bystanders in Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Pakistani and Afghan governments have repeatedly warned that we are alienating precisely the people we claim to be saving for democracy.


When in May 2009, General Stanley McChrystal was appointed as the commander in Afghanistan, he ordered new limits on air attacks, including those carried out by the CIA, except when needed to protect allied troops. Unfortunately, as if to illustrate the incompetence of our chain of command, only two days after this order, on June 23, 2009, the United States carried out a drone attack against a funeral procession that killed at least 80 people, the single deadliest U.S. attack on Pakistani soil so far. There was virtually no reporting of these developments by the mainstream American press or on the network television news. (At the time, the media were almost totally preoccupied by the sexual adventures of the governor of South Carolina and the death of pop star Michael Jackson.)


Our military operations in both Pakistan and Afghanistan have long been plagued by inadequate and inaccurate intelligence about both countries, ideological preconceptions about which parties we should support and which ones we should oppose, and myopic understandings of what we could possibly hope to achieve. Fitzgerald and Gould, for example, charge that, contrary to our own intelligence service's focus on Afghanistan, "Pakistan has always been the problem." They add:

"Pakistan's army and its Inter-Services Intelligence branch... from 1973 on, has played the key role in funding and directing first the mujahideen [anti-Soviet fighters during the 1980s]… and then the Taliban. It is Pakistan's army that controls its nuclear weapons, constrains the development of democratic institutions, trains Taliban fighters in suicide attacks and orders them to fight American and NATO soldiers protecting the Afghan government." (p. 322-324)

The Pakistani army and its intelligence arm are staffed, in part, by devout Muslims who fostered the Taliban in Afghanistan to meet the needs of their own agenda, though not necessarily to advance an Islamic jihad. Their purposes have always included: keeping Afghanistan free of Russian or Indian influence, providing a training and recruiting ground for mujahideen guerrillas to be used in places like Kashmir (fought over by both Pakistan and India), containing Islamic radicalism in Afghanistan (and so keeping it out of Pakistan), and extorting huge amounts of money from Saudi Arabia, the Persian Gulf emirates, and the United States to pay and train "freedom fighters" throughout the Islamic world. Pakistan's consistent policy has been to support the clandestine policies of the Inter-Services Intelligence and thwart the influence of its major enemy and competitor, India.

Colonel Douglas MacGregor, U.S. Army (retired), an adviser to the Center for Defense Information in Washington, summarizes our hopeless project in South Asia this way: "Nothing we do will compel 125 million Muslims in Pakistan to make common cause with a United States in league with the two states that are unambiguously anti-Muslim: Israel and India."


Obama's mid-2009 "surge" of troops into southern Afghanistan and particularly into Helmand Province, a Taliban stronghold, is fast becoming darkly reminiscent of General William Westmoreland's continuous requests in Vietnam for more troops and his promises that if we would ratchet up the violence just a little more and tolerate a few more casualties, we would certainly break the will of the Vietnamese insurgents. This was a total misreading of the nature of the conflict in Vietnam, just as it is in Afghanistan today.


Twenty years after the forces of the Red Army withdrew from Afghanistan in disgrace, the last Russian general to command them, Gen. Boris Gromov, issued his own prediction: Disaster, he insisted, will come to the thousands of new forces Obama is sending there, just as it did to the Soviet Union's, which lost some 15,000 soldiers in its own Afghan war. We should recognize that we are wasting time, lives, and resources in an area where we have never understood the political dynamics and continue to make the wrong choices.


3. We Need to End the Secret Shame of Our Empire of Bases

In March, New York Times op-ed columnist Bob Herbert noted, "Rape and other forms of sexual assault against women is the great shame of the U.S. armed forces, and there is no evidence that this ghastly problem, kept out of sight as much as possible, is diminishing." He continued:

"New data released by the Pentagon showed an almost 9 percent increase in the number of sexual assaults -- 2,923 -- and a 25 percent increase in such assaults reported by women serving in Iraq and Afghanistan [over the past year]. Try to imagine how bizarre it is that women in American uniforms who are enduring all the stresses related to serving in a combat zone have to also worry about defending themselves against rapists wearing the same uniform and lining up in formation right beside them."

The problem is exacerbated by having our troops garrisoned in overseas bases located cheek-by-jowl next to civilian populations and often preying on them like foreign conquerors. For example, sexual violence against women and girls by American GIs has been out of control in Okinawa, Japan's poorest prefecture, ever since it was permanently occupied by our soldiers, Marines, and airmen some 64 years ago.


That island was the scene of the largest anti-American demonstrations since the end of World War II after the 1995 kidnapping, rape, and attempted murder of a 12-year-old schoolgirl by two Marines and a sailor. The problem of rape has been ubiquitous around all of our bases on every continent and has probably contributed as much to our being loathed abroad as the policies of the Bush administration or our economic exploitation of poverty-stricken countries whose raw materials we covet.


The military itself has done next to nothing to protect its own female soldiers or to defend the rights of innocent bystanders forced to live next to our often racially biased and predatory troops. "The military's record of prosecuting rapists is not just lousy, it's atrocious," writes Herbert. In territories occupied by American military forces, the high command and the State Department make strenuous efforts to enact so-called "Status of Forces Agreements" (SOFAs) that will prevent host governments from gaining jurisdiction over our troops who commit crimes overseas. The SOFAs also make it easier for our military to spirit culprits out of a country before they can be apprehended by local authorities.


This issue was well illustrated by the case of an Australian teacher, a long-time resident of Japan, who in April 2002 was raped by a sailor from the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk, then based at the big naval base at Yokosuka. She identified her assailant and reported him to both Japanese and U.S. authorities. Instead of his being arrested and effectively prosecuted, the victim herself was harassed and humiliated by the local Japanese police. Meanwhile, the U.S. discharged the suspect from the Navy but allowed him to escape Japanese law by returning him to the U.S., where he lives today.


In the course of trying to obtain justice, the Australian teacher discovered that almost fifty years earlier, in October 1953, the Japanese and American governments signed a secret "understanding" as part of their SOFA in which Japan agreed to waive its jurisdiction if the crime was not of "national importance to Japan." The U.S. argued strenuously for this codicil because it feared that otherwise it would face the likelihood of some 350 servicemen per year being sent to Japanese jails for sex crimes.


Since that time the U.S. has negotiated similar wording in SOFAs with Canada, Ireland, Italy, and Denmark. According to the Handbook of the Law of Visiting Forces (2001), the Japanese practice has become the norm for SOFAs throughout the world, with predictable results. In Japan, of 3,184 U.S. military personnel who committed crimes between 2001 and 2008, 83% were not prosecuted. In Iraq, we have just signed a SOFA that bears a strong resemblance to the first postwar one we had with Japan: namely, military personnel and military contractors accused of off-duty crimes will remain in U.S. custody while Iraqis investigate. This is, of course, a perfect opportunity to spirit the culprits out of the country before they can be charged.


Within the military itself, the journalist Dahr Jamail, author of Beyond the Green Zone: Dispatches from an Unembedded Journalist in Occupied Iraq (Haymarket Books, 2007), speaks of the "culture of unpunished sexual assaults" and the "shockingly low numbers of courts martial" for rapes and other forms of sexual attacks. Helen Benedict, author of The Lonely Soldier: The Private War of Women Serving in Iraq (Beacon Press, 2009), quotes this figure in a 2009 Pentagon report on military sexual assaults: 90% of the rapes in the military are never reported at all and, when they are, the consequences for the perpetrator are negligible.


It is fair to say that the U.S. military has created a worldwide sexual playground for its personnel and protected them to a large extent from the consequences of their behavior. As a result a group of female veterans in 2006 created the Service Women's Action Network (SWAN). Its agenda is to spread the word that "no woman should join the military."

I believe a better solution would be to radically reduce the size of our standing army, and bring the troops home from countries where they do not understand their environments and have been taught to think of the inhabitants as inferior to themselves.


10 Steps Toward Liquidating the Empire

Dismantling the American empire would, of course, involve many steps. Here are ten key places to begin:

1. We need to put a halt to the serious environmental damage done by our bases planet-wide. We also need to stop writing SOFAs that exempt us from any responsibility for cleaning up after ourselves.

2. Liquidating the empire will end the burden of carrying our empire of bases and so of the "opportunity costs" that go with them -- the things we might otherwise do with our talents and resources but can't or won't.

3. As we already know (but often forget), imperialism breeds the use of torture. In the 1960s and 1970s we helped overthrow the elected governments in Brazil and Chile and underwrote regimes of torture that prefigured our own treatment of prisoners in Iraq and Afghanistan. (See, for instance, A.J. Langguth, Hidden Terrors [Pantheon, 1979], on how the U.S. spread torture methods to Brazil and Uruguay.) Dismantling the empire would potentially mean a real end to the modern American record of using torture abroad.

4. We need to cut the ever-lengthening train of camp followers, dependents, civilian employees of the Department of Defense, and hucksters -- along with their expensive medical facilities, housing requirements, swimming pools, clubs, golf courses, and so forth -- that follow our military enclaves around the world.

5. We need to discredit the myth promoted by the military-industrial complex that our military establishment is valuable to us in terms of jobs, scientific research, and defense. These alleged advantages have long been discredited by serious economic research. Ending empire would make this happen.

6. As a self-respecting democratic nation, we need to stop being the world's largest exporter of arms and munitions and quit educating Third World militaries in the techniques of torture, military coups, and service as proxies for our imperialism. A prime candidate for immediate closure is the so-called School of the Americas, the U.S. Army's infamous military academy at Fort Benning, Georgia, for Latin American military officers. (See Chalmers Johnson, The Sorrows of Empire [Metropolitan Books, 2004], pp. 136-40.)

7. Given the growing constraints on the federal budget, we should abolish the Reserve Officers' Training Corps and other long-standing programs that promote militarism in our schools.

8. We need to restore discipline and accountability in our armed forces by radically scaling back our reliance on civilian contractors, private military companies, and agents working for the military outside the chain of command and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. (See Jeremy Scahill, Blackwater:The Rise of the World's Most Powerful Mercenary Army [Nation Books, 2007]). Ending empire would make this possible.

9. We need to reduce, not increase, the size of our standing army and deal much more effectively with the wounds our soldiers receive and combat stress they undergo.

10. To repeat the main message of this essay, we must give up our inappropriate reliance on military force as the chief means of attempting to achieve foreign policy objectives.

Unfortunately, few empires of the past voluntarily gave up their dominions in order to remain independent, self-governing polities. The two most important recent examples are the British and Soviet empires. If we do not learn from their examples, our decline and fall is foreordained.


Chalmers Johnson is the author of Blowback (2000), The Sorrows of Empire (2004), and Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (2006), among other works.  His newest book, Dismantling the Empire: America's Last Best Hope (Metropolitan Books), has just been published.  To listen to Timothy MacBain's latest TomCast audio interview in which Johnson discusses America's empire of bases and his new book, click here or, to download it to your iPod, here.

http://www.alternet.org/world/147964/10_needed_steps_for_obama_to_start_dismantling_america%27s_gigantic%2C_destructive_military_empire/?page=entire
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
The United States is not a 'self-respecting democratic nation' as noted in this article. The U.S.A. is now the home fo the largest, strongest Empire in human history. A true independent nation will be governed by fair, democratic-socialist humane principles. This is the great self-delusion of Americans. Nowadays U.S. Elections are bought by the highest bidder, like an auction. I doubt if the great Amerikan Empire will allow it to simply be dismantled.
Unidos Venceremos! United We Will Win!
~Peta-de-Aztlan~ Sacramento, California, Amerika
Email: peter.lopez51@yahoo.com
http://twitter.com/Peta_de_Aztlan
http://www.facebook.com/Peta51
http://help-matrix.ning.com/
"An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come."
~ Victor Hugo, 18th Century French Philosopher c/s

Monday, August 23, 2010

Yep. Reagan did the A-word via PolitiFact

http://t.co/1xAdLPW via @politifact

The Truth-O-Meter Says:
"Ronald Reagan did amnesty."

Rudy Giuliani on Saturday, January 5th, 2008 in a debate in Manchester, N.H.

Yep. Reagan did the A-word

The GOP candidates keep sparring over who's tougher on immigration. In this climate, dem is fightin' words to say your opponent supports "sanctuary" or "amnesty" for illegal immigrants.


But as Giuliani reminded his foes during the Jan. 5, 2008, Republican debate, none other than Ronald Reagan, the patron saint of modern-day conservatism, signed the very law that Republicans call amnesty.Say it ain't so!


Sorry. It's so. In 1986, Reagan signed an immigration reform bill, the first in 20 years, that legalized the status for 1.7-million people. Some defenders of the law dispute the term "amnesty."


But here's how Edwin Meese, Reagan's former attorney general, characterizes what his boss did: "President Reagan called this what it was: amnesty. Indeed, look up the term 'amnesty' in Black's Law Dictionary, and you'll find it says, 'the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act provided amnesty for undocumented aliens already in the country.' "

Reagan signed the bill after Republicans and Democrats cobbled together an amnesty program in response to concerns from farmers worried about harvesting profits. The official record of congressional debates shows that lawmakers intended the program to provide a steady supply of labor for growers of perishable crops, such as cherries, grapes, peaches, etc. At the time the bill was written, however, "perishable" was defined so loosely that more durable crops such as potted plants, tobacco and seedlings were lumped in as well.

So even at the start, this program could be interpreted in ways that would benefit employers looking to save on wages.


To qualify for temporary status, migrants had to show they entered the United States before Jan. 1, 1982, and that they had continuously resided since then. They could get permanent residency within 18 months after that if they met certain requirements, such as learning English. The program took effect in 1987, also covering up to 350,000 people who had worked in U.S. agriculture at least 90 days in each of the preceding three years.


Many have called the program a success because it awarded green cards to 2.7-million migrants, giving them the hope of entry to the American middle class.


In exchange for the amnesty, the new law was supposed to have beefed up border patrols and stiffened fines for both the migrant workers and employers in cases of violation. Alas, the law failed to stop illegal immigration, and many critics of the law say the government never thoroughly regulated employers who skirted the law's requirements.

This much is certain: If the law aimed to curb illegal immigration, it failed: When the law was passed, there were about 5-million illegal immigrants; now, there's an estimated 12-million.


When Reagan signed the law, many predicted it would encourage the hiring of more migrants, especially outside of agriculture, and that this would spur the backlash against immigration that we're seeing today.


Giuliani, it would seem, brought up Reagan's legacy to show how difficult the immigration issue is. In doing so, he didn't trip any alarms on the Truth-O-Meter, which scores him a True.


+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Unidos Venceremos! United We Will Win!
~Peta-de-Aztlan~ Sacramento, California, Amerika
Email: peter.lopez51@yahoo.com
http://twitter.com/Peta_de_Aztlan
http://www.facebook.com/Peta51
http://help-matrix.ning.com/
"An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come."
~ Victor Hugo, 18th Century French Philosopher c/s

Visualizing the Immigration Debate (12 photos)

http://bit.ly/bAsxgR

alice
Visualizing the Immigration Debate (12 photos)

With a career that started in the 1970s and continues on today, Don Bartletti is a photojournalist who helps us see our world through a different set of eyes. Self-taught, Bartletti found his calling back in 1971 as a 24-year-old Army infantry officer in Vietnam. Since then, he's documented the never-ending-story of the immigration debate, even winning the Pulitzer Prize in feature photography for his six-part photo essay about undocumented Central American youth. He captured Honduran minors longing for a better life, facing deadly danger to travel north to the United States. Some of those photos are seen here.

More than anything, Bartletti's photos make us realize how complicated the immigration debate really is and shows us just how powerful photography can be. When we see the faces of these migrant workers seeking to provide for their families, going to great lengths, even risking their own lives to achieve this, one can't help but see the individual, humanistic side to the story.

As Bartletti says, "The immigration debate isn't nearly as simple as a million people coming across the border and sending a billion dollars back home. There are individual decisions made by the family members that leave, there are tragedies, there's heartbreak, there are broken families."
Goto:
http://www.mymodernmet.com/profiles/blogs/visualizing-the-immigration
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Unidos Venceremos! United We Will Win!
~Peta-de-Aztlan~ Sacramento, California, Amerika
Email: peter.lopez51@yahoo.com
http://twitter.com/Peta_de_Aztlan
http://www.facebook.com/Peta51
http://help-matrix.ning.com/
"An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come."
~ Victor Hugo, 18th Century French Philosopher c/s


Thursday, August 19, 2010

Counter-Insurgency: From Latin America to Afghanistan

http://bit.ly/dcCBzX

First Published 2010-08-19

Counter-Insurgency: From Latin America to Afghanistan

 
The US COIN program has its origins in the decades long US interventions - secretive and not so - in its own southern hemisphere. And the war in Afghanistan (and in Iraq) takes on the same state terror versus insurgent terror attributes of that long era of violence, notes Pablo Behrens.

 
In recent decades there have been only one or two precedents in which the United States and the United Kingdom could analyze directly the use of guerilla warfare by insurgents, and the response by government authorities. In the US' case it was the urban guerilla movement and the 'threat' of progressive political parties in South and Central America and the State terror it unleashed during the 1970s. In the case of the UK, it was the IRA mainland attacks of the 1980s.


Their experience in those two conflicts cannot be underestimated and in one form or another lessons learnt by both re-surfaced in Iraq and Afghanistan. It is unthinkable that US government agencies such as the Pentagon, the CIA and the NSA has not applied the lessons learned in Latin America, when less than twenty years later the White House would be directly involved in a war against insurgency.


In the case of the UK, it was a source of pride for their military cadres to freely admit that British commanders were applying "lessons learnt in Belfast" in their war against the urban insurgency in Basra.


At some point, the Global War on Terror of 2001 turned into a War on Insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq. And the nations that signed up for those wars did not imagine is that one day they would be using the same tactics as the enemy they were trying to destroy.


Terror attack takes various forms. A bomb from nowhere, kidnap or arrest without trial, renditions, assassinations, secret prisons, improvised explosive devices, drone attacks, summary executions and torture. Anything goes. Terror is a State tactic as well as an insurgency tactic. It is borne from a need to produce results quicker than more conventional warfare or legal means. The difference is that one side is condemned by the law of the land while the other acts with impunity and is above the law.


The methods of recruitment, command, control and attack used by the urban guerillas in the big cities of South America in the past are very similar to the methods insurgents use today in Baghdad, Basra, Kandahar or Kabul -- with the exception of suicide attacks and that Latin American guerillas generally targeted government forces as per the Cuban model. But for any insurgent anywhere in the world it's still the same old Che Guevara tactic of "bite and flee" (muerde y huye). In its simplest form it's a small arms attack by a group of guerillas and then back to the shadows. By the time government forces are able to respond they find only the dust settling and a few dead bodies.


The authority in Iraq and more so now in Afghanistan is none other than the US occupation army. As such it responds the only way it knows: an iron fist that smashes anything that moves -- it's the 'kill today, ask human rights questions tomorrow' method. The reasoning is simple: If Che Guevara and his urban cohorts had been dealt with that way, why not Osama bin Laden's irregulars?


There is no other recent learning curve in either the United States or the UK than their respective experiences in Latin America and Northern Ireland. Except Vietnam, but that was a war the United States lost.


Thanks to the passage of time we now know how military juntas in Latin America dealt with guerillas or political threats. Torture was widespread as well as mass arrests; paramilitary elements organized political assassinations via death squads; illegal flights across frontiers were used to transport kidnapped dissidents or insurgency suspects for torture. During this period, a permanent, widespread presence of US intelligence operatives maintained contact with local military agencies, advising and protecting.


All the above was 'stock in trade' in Latin America between the early 60s and the mid 80s. A kind of 'operations manual' for counter-insurgency success was being drawn up for future conflicts by research elements in the US state security establishment. The preferred chapter was the use of violent attack against anybody deemed a suspect on the flimsiest of evidences. Insurgency was stamped out in Latin America by the sheer force of the bloodbath committed by State terror. Only human rights organizations bothered then as they still bother today and only one or two Western countries batted an eye as the horror was unleashed.


All Latin American military juntas of the period were supported by successive US administrations through generous loans, arms and training of military, police and intelligence cadres. That campaign is still today considered an unmitigated military success by US security.


That's why we should not be surprised if in the last few years a similar counter-insurgency strategy was apparently applied by the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan. The hallmark was the same: rendition flights of suspects, arrests without trial and rumors of torture in Guantanamo Bay, Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, and Abu Ghraib in Iraq. There were also secret assassination squads, trigger happy soldiers and CIA-run secret prisons.


In the War on Insurgency in Afghanistan and Iraq what was happening was just the recycling of a tried and tested formula first applied "successfully" years earlier in Latin America.


The main difference between a war on insurgency in Latin America and counter-insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan is that in the former case, the human rights violations were carried out by the military juntas of each country concerned and US involvement was kept out of the limelight. In Afghanistan and Iraq, the equivalent military power is nonexistent or unreliable, so the United States has to carry out the repression by itself. Their heavy handed modus operandi -- the only one they know -- is confirmed in a number of leaks over the years and published by newspapers like the Washington Post, by the WikiLeaks web site, or by denunciations from organizations like Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.


So now the counter-insurgency manual is found faulty, as the power exercising the repression, the United States, has been caught red-handed and there is no one else to blame. It was easy to claim "plausible deniability" when violations were carried out by well known South American military butchers like Garrastazu Medici in Brazil, Videla in Argentina, or Pinochet in Chile. It is more difficult to apply it when the only military game in town is the United States.

State terror has its limits. It can kill some of the people all the time. It can even kill all the people some of the time. But it cannot kill all the people all the time. Some wars are better lost.


Pablo Behrens is a Uruguayan freelance journalist based in London, England. Between 2005-2008 Pablo was London correspondent for La Republica covering the terrorist attacks in the London Underground, the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and general national and international policy of the British government within the War on Terror framework.

Copyright © 2010 Pablo Behrens – distributed by Agence Global


http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/opinion/?id=40715
+++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
Unidos Venceremos! United We Will Win!
~Peta-de-Aztlan~ Sacramento, California, Amerika
Email: peter.lopez51@yahoo.com
http://twitter.com/Peta_de_Aztlan
http://www.facebook.com/Peta51
http://help-matrix.ning.com/
"An invasion of armies can be resisted, but not an idea whose time has come."
~ Victor Hugo, 18th Century French Philosopher c/s